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The Doctrine of Legal Writing
Book Review of Linda H. Edwards’s Readings in Persuasion:
Briefs That Changed the World
Lucille A. Jewel *
Abstract
In legal education, the word “doctrinal” is most often used to refer
to courses such as Contracts, Torts, Property, and Criminal Procedure.
Doctrinal has long been used as a descriptive adjective, but also as a word
of exclusion. We often hear legal writing courses are not substantive and
not as significant as doctrinal courses. Linda Edwards’s new book, Readings in Persuasion: Briefs that Changed the World, persuasively challenges
this view.
This Article evaluates what we mean when we use the term doctrinal
in a legal education context and considers six powerful descriptors for the
doctrine of legal writing, all extrapolated from Edwards’s book: (1) legal
writing is founded upon a collective body of robust scholarship; (2) it
relies upon principles of science to create legal meaning; (3) it embraces
an artistic craft model for the production of legal meanings, emphasizing
the creativity, autonomy, and discretion that form the core of a lawyer’s
professional identity; (4) it involves critical introspection, opening up
areas of thought traditionally obscured in legal education and ensuring
that law students appreciate the power they will eventually wield in law
practice; (5) it is substantive because legal writing is law making—we
cannot separate the substance of the law from the words we use to forge
legal meanings; and finally, (6) because it relies on real cases and context
to teach students how to engage with the legal process, the doctrine of
legal writing builds and improves upon law school’s classic case-method
pedagogy.
Introduction
In legal education, the word “doctrinal” is most often used to refer to
core law courses such as Contracts, Torts, Property, and Criminal Proce-

*
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dure. 1 Doctrinal has long been used as a descriptive adjective, but also as
a word of exclusion; we often hear that legal writing courses are not substantive and are not as significant as doctrinal courses. 2 Linda Edwards’s
new book, Readings in Persuasion: Briefs that Changed the World, 3 challenges this view. 4 Undergirded by Edwards’s book, this Article argues
that legal writing should be considered a substantive, doctrinal course.
Before I address my thesis that legal writing should be considered a
doctrinal course, which is sure to generate some dissensus, let us consider what we mean when we use the label “doctrinal” 5 in legal education. To a certain extent, we may be using an overly narrow definition of
doctrinal to describe certain aspects of the law school curriculum.
As used in the context of legal education, doctrinal often takes on a
meaning that embraces a formalist approach to legal analysis. When law
professors use the term to refer to a course like Contracts, they are usually referring to a specific legal doctrine—“[t]hat which is taught or laid
down as true concerning a particular subject or department of knowledge
. . . a belief, theoretical opinion; a dogma, tenet.” 6 We might say that
doctrine takes on a dogmatic connotation, implying certainty in the law,
the idea that one can arrive at the singular “correct” understanding of

1
David S. Romantz, The Truth About Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses
and the Law School Curriculum, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 105, 106 (2003) (defining
Contracts, Torts, Property, and Criminal Procedure as “traditional doctrinal
courses”); Lorne Sossin, Discourse Politics: Legal Research and Writing’s Search
for a Pedagog y of Its Own, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 883, 883-84 (1994) (stating
Torts, Contracts, Criminal Law, and Civil Procedure are traditionally touted as
law school’s most “heroic” core courses).
2
Romantz, supra note 1, at 106-07; Sossin, supra note 1, at 883-84.
3
Linda H. Edwards, Readings in Persuasion: Briefs That
Changed The World (2012) [hereinafter Edwards, Readings in Persuasion].
4
As a personal anecdote, I must explain what a tremendous influence
this piece has had on my professional development as a teacher and scholar. I
stumbled upon this chapter in my first year of teaching law. After I read it, I
began to discard the professional identity that my institution had imposed upon
me—the idea that I merely taught technical composition and corrected student
papers. I started to construct a professional identity for myself as a teacher who
pushes students to think hard, grapple with doctrine, and figure out how to manipulate the law in the most sophisticated ways—all with the goal of producing
compelling work product. In addition to helping me construct a forward-looking
professional identity, this chapter also ignited the associative connections that
propelled me to start writing scholarship that touched on critical legal theory,
hierarchy, legal culture, and legal rhetoric.
5
In this Article, I use the noun “doctrine” and the adjective “doctrinal”
interchangeably.
6
The Oxford English Dictionary, Doctrine Definition 2(b) 916,
(2d ed. (1991)).
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The Doctrine Of Legal Writing
a particular body of legal knowledge. 7 This understanding of doctrine
is thus closely aligned with a formalistic approach to law, the idea that
“moral and legal reasoning [is simply the] application of literally-defined
objective categories to situations in an all-or-nothing fashion, based on
fixed criteria.” 8
The doctrinal concept also encompasses a religion metaphor, with
the law professor playing the role of a preacher, using incisive Socratic
questioning to shepherd students to the “correct” legal analyses. 9 Conjuring up this particular metaphor for legal education—of the law professor as preacher—draws an analogy to worship practices of the Puritans in early America, where the minister conveyed “the Word” from a
raised pulpit, decorated with “an enormous, carefully painted, staring
eye, a terrible and suggestive illustration to youthful wrongdoers.” 10 The
preacher, or minister in Puritan culture, was considered “an ambassador
from the great Sovereign of the universe” 11 whose lectures contained no
room for pluralist perspectives. 12 In developing this metaphor, I do not
mean to imply that all preachers and ministers proceed in such a topdown manner. In other religious contexts, preachers deliver sermons in
a more open-ended style, engaging listeners with a series of questions to

7
For instance, early descriptions of the case-method posited that the most
intelligent law students would be able to wrestle with seemingly disparate cases
to distill the “correct” law to apply in a given case. See W. Burlette Carter,
Reconstructing Langdell, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 83-84 (1997). Asserting there is a
single correct answer in legal analysis relies on the premise that legal analysis is
merely the “application of rules to facts with a right answer presumed [and that
all] the competent practitioner [needs to do is] ‘connect category to case.’”;
Gerald P. Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to Work With the Politically and Socially
Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. Va. L. Rev. 305, 322 (1989).
8
Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, and Law, 58 Mercer L. Rev. 845
(2007), as reprinted in Edwards, supra note 3, at 233.
9
See Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to “Think Like A Lawyer” 51 (2007) (describing the method in
which law students listen to the “preaching” of their professors and then, in
response to the professor’s questions, repeat back “the Word” of the professor).
10
Alice Morse Earle, The Sabbath in Puritan New England
8 (Aertena Publishing 2010) (1891), quoted in David Hackett Fisher, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America 118 (1989).
11
Harriet Beecher Stowe, Oldtown Folks (1869), reprinted in
Harriet Beecher Stowe, Three Novels: Uncle Tom’s Cabin;
or Life Among the Lowly; The Minister’s Wooing; Oldtown
Folks 877, 940 (1982) quoted in Fisher, supra note 10, at 120.
12
See Fisher, supra note 10, at 24 (explaining how the Puritan concept
of the Word, conveyed by ministers via the meetinghouse lecture, connoted an
“absolute authority.”); Stowe, supra note 11, at 1251 (describing one Puritan
minister as “making it clear to those who heard him that there was no choice
between believing his hard doctrines and giving up the Bible altogether”).
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consider, but with no set answers. 13 Similar to an orthodox approach to
religious texts, abstracted appellate opinions—the reading materials in
the traditional law school classroom—tend to produce narrow and constrained legal meanings. Traditional legal education’s reliance on laconic
appellate opinions as its canonical texts has been described as excluding
all of the messy realities that spring from “everyday life,” 14 and unrealistically presenting legal knowledge as “doctrine in a vacuum.” 15 When appellate judicial authors and casebook editors carefully excise contextual
facts from the case, they cloak the text with authority by cultivating the
style of an “oracle . . . voicing the dictates of a vague divinity.” 16 In this
metaphor for traditional legal education, the law professor as preacher
strictly controls the presentation of a narrow universe of case materials to
produce a unitary “correct” view of the law, the law as the Word.
Legal doctrine as orthodoxy rests on an impoverished conception of
legal knowledge and law practice. Legal knowledge is “not an abstract
system or scheme of rules” but is instead an “inherently unstable structure of thought and expression . . . built upon a distinct set of dynamic and dialogic tensions.” 17 Competent law practice cannot be reduced
to the technical application of a category to a determinate set of facts.

13
See, e.g., James Boyd White, Connecting to the Gospel,
Texts, Sermons, Commentaries (2010) [hereinafter White, Connecting to the Gospel]. In addition to his influence as a legal thinker,
Professor White is a lay preacher in the Episcopal Church. In his sermons,
Professor White approaches biblical texts with the same dynamic inquisitiveness
that he brings to his analysis of contemporary legal problems. Jack L. Sammons,
Mercer Law Professor, comments on White’s book, stating that “[t]he theology
at work in these readings is never argued; it is just offered.” Jack L. Sammons,
Being There: James Boyd White’s Biblical Hermaneutics, Amazon, http://goo.
gl/7ctijZ (reviewing White, Connecting to the Gospel (March 28,
2010)).
14
Lopez, supra note 7, at 336 (“Make anyone read, talk about, and deploy
too many appellate cases, they say, and you’ll see them inevitably move away
from everyday life—away from detail, away from context, and away from passion.”).
15
James Boyd White, Doctrine in a Vacuum: Reflections on What A Law School
Ought (and Ought Not) to Be, 36 J. Legal Educ. 156, 159 (1986) [hereinafter
White, Doctrine in a Vacuum] (“The focus on discrete texts and the chain of
texts . . . thus becomes a focus on doctrine in a vacuum.”).
16
John T. Noonan, Jr., Persons and Masks of the Law: Cardozo, Holmes, Jefferson, and Wythe as Makers of the Masks
140 (2002) (citation omitted) (quoting Judge Learned Hand’s description of
Judge Cardozo’s writing style).
17
James Boyd White, An Old Fashioned View of the Nature of Law, 12 Theoretical Inquiries L. 381 (2011), as reprinted in Edwards, supra note 3, at
325 [hereinafter White, An Old Fashioned View of the Nature of Law].
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Rather, law practice is an empowering art form 18 requiring an intensive
engagement with:
the dynamics of inevitably working with other people in framing
and responding to conflicting, uncertain[,] and unique situations;
the interaction of lay and professional understanding and knowhow; the influence of cultural and cognitive forces on problemsolving; and the impact of income and other power disparities on
perceptions and strategies. 19
Finally, a comparison can be made between religious metaphor and
legal doctrine, which ultimately denies autonomy and individuality to future law practitioners. Law students ought not be infantilized as sitting in
pews and passively receiving knowledge imparted from the professor on
high. Rather, as professors, we should celebrate the legal classroom as a
space where law is made. 20 The top-down vision of the doctrinal professor
as priest imparting legal rules denies the boundless promise of legal education to open up students “[to] the ethical and intellectual possibilities
of the lawyer’s life . . . far more interesting, challenging, and ethically
alive, than the view of the lawyer as rule-applier.” 21
After considering these connotations for the word doctrinal, I am not
certain that doctrinal is an accurate term for any aspect of legal education. However, legal writing has long been caught up in a false dichotomy
between substantive doctrine and skill, 22 also characterized as a division
between theory and practice. 23 In debunking the false premise that legal writing is non-substantive because it focuses exclusively on technical
mastery, Mary Beth Beazely states it best: “Legal writing is not focused
on grammar any more than tax law is focused on math.” 24 Substance and
skill necessarily merge together in any legal writing class. Legal writing
professors teach analytical skills in the context of substantive law, incorporating civil procedure, modes of legal reasoning, common law rule synthesis, statutory rule construction, policy arguments, and professional
18
Edwards, supra note 3, at 341-42 (excerpting White, An Old Fashioned
View of the Nature of the Law, supra note 17).
19
Lopez, supra note 7, at 322.
20
White, Doctrine in a Vacuum, supra note 15, at 162. James Boyd White
states that when a student applies and considers the law, he is actually making
law in the classroom. Hence, “[a] good law school is thus a school of law-making.”
21
Edwards, supra note 3, at 402 (excerpting White, An Old Fashioned
View of the Nature of Law, supra note 17).
22
J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View,
69 Wash. L. Rev. 35, 45 (1994) (describing the substance-skills dichotomy,
with legal writing courses maligned as non-substantive).
23
Romantz, supra note 1, at 126.
24
Mary Beth Beazley, Riddikulus! Tenure-Track Legal-Writing Faculty and the
Boggart in the Wardrobe, 7 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 79, 81 (2000).
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ethics. 25 Thus, legal writing inhabits both the realm of substance and skill,
theory and practice, revealing that the mutually exclusive dichotomy between doctrine and writing is false. 26 Because the doctrinal appellation
operates as a term of exclusion that cements one of legal education’s most
harmful hierarchies, 27 legal skills teachers might use the term doctrinal as
a rhetorical strategy to attack this false dichotomy. However, establishing
legal writing as a doctrine might require that we adopt a broader meaning than the formalistic and religious connotation commonly associated
with the term in the legal education context. “That which is taught” is
a broader, but still accurate, definition of doctrine. 28 Etymologically, the
word doctrine derives from the Latin word doctrina 29 (teaching and learning) and doctor (teacher). 30 When we consider doctrine’s original connotation focused on teaching and learning, then doctrinal appropriately
describes what legal educators do. Taking this broader and more accurate
definition of doctrine, let us use Linda Edwards’s book as our reference
guide to further define the doctrine of legal writing. What exactly is the
doctrine of legal writing?
As the following sections set forth, six powerful descriptors for the
doctrine of legal writing, all can be extrapolated from Edwards’s book: (1)
the doctrine of legal writing is founded upon a collective body of robust
scholarship; (2) it relies upon principles of science to propel us to a greater understanding of how to best create legal meanings; (3) it embraces an
artistic craft model for the production of legal meanings, emphasizing
the creativity, autonomy, and discretion that form the core of a lawyer’s
professional identity; (4) it necessarily involves a certain amount of critical introspection, opening up areas of thought that are traditionally obscured in legal education and ensuring that law learners appreciate the
power that they will eventually wield in law practice; (5) it is substantive
because legal writing is law making—we cannot separate the substance
of the law from the words we use to forge legal meanings; and finally, (6)
because it relies on real cases and context to teach students how to engage
with the legal process, the doctrine of legal writing builds and improves
Beazley, supra note 24, at 81; Romantz, supra note 1, at 138.
Sossin, supra note 1, at 890.
27
I am referring to the status hierarchy that elevates casebook faculty over
faculty who teach legal skills. See Kent D. Syverud, The Caste System and Best
Practices in Legal Education, 1 J. ALWD 12, 13-15 (2002) (explaining that legal
writing faculty occupy the bottom rung of the law professoriate’s occupational
hierarchy); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Who Next, the Janitors? A Socio-Feminist
Critique of the Status Hierarchy of Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 467, 468
(2004) (explaining that the division between doctrinal and legal writing professors is an elitist and institutionalized status system).
28
The Oxford English Dictionary, supra note 6.
29
Junior Classic Latin Dictionary 37 (1944).
30
Id.
25

26
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upon law school’s classic case-method pedagogy.
Legal Writing Doctrine is Founded Upon a Robust Body of Scholarship
Professor Edwards dedicates her book “[t]o the scholars whose work
is represented here and to those on whose shoulders they stand.” 31 The
dedication is a fitting beginning to the book, which is organized in two
parts. Part One of the book contains over forty excerpts of scholarly articles, many penned by legal writing professors, addressing the art and
science of successful legal communication. Part Two contains contextual
essays meant to be read in tandem with a series of briefs that successfully
broke new ground in the law-making process. 32 The excerpts in Part One
cover wide-ranging topics relevant to legal persuasion, including explorations of cognitive science, classical rhetoric, literary theory, narrative
theory, and jurisprudence.
The scholarly contributions that comprise this book instantiate the
wisdom and vibrancy of legal writing’s professional community. The collective format of the book also provides the student with an understanding that expertise in legal communication derives from many critical and
interdisciplinary sources. In this way, the book supports the view that
legal writing competence requires more than a superficial mastery of
technical rules. Continuous knowledge-seeking from a wealth of sources
is necessary in striving for expertise in legal persuasion, which reinforces
the value of having legal writing teachers contribute to the legal scholarship.
Legal Writing Doctrine is Founded Upon Science
Edwards excerpts several authors whose research takes a scientific
approach toward persuasion. Several of these articles approach persuasion from the perspective of cognitive science. When applied to legal
persuasion, the value of cognitive science:
lies in its ability to make explicit the unconscious criteria and
cognitive operations that structure and constitute our judgment.
It is by laying bare these cognitive structures and their impact on
our reasoning that we can best aid legal actors—whether advocates or decision-makers—who wish to understand the law better
so that they can act more effectively. 33
For instance, in one excerpt, Professor Kathryn Stanchi applies the
tested psychological principle of priming to making legal arguments. 34
Edwards, supra note 3, at viii.
Edwards, supra note 3, at xix.
33
Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life,
and Mind, at xi-xvii (2011), as reprinted in Edwards, supra note 3, at 250.
34
Kathryn Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006
Mich. St. L. Rev. 411, 415. [hereinafter Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion],
as reprinted in Edwards, supra note 3, at 115.
31

32
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If members of an audience are primed for an argument (if they have acquiesced to a request), then they are more likely to acquiesce to the next
proposition. 35 As this pertains to constructing a legal argument, one can
begin with seemingly inconsequential and uncontroversial premises that
the reader will easily accept, creating a probability that the reader will
remain consistent and acquiesce to each successive premise. 36 Another
priming strategy is to begin with an argument premise that is big and for
which one is unlikely to receive acquiescence. 37 The resulting sense of
guilt or dissonance that comes from not acquiescing to the premise (or
not complying with a tit for tat cultural norm) will increase the likelihood
of a positive response to a smaller premise. 38
Professor Stanchi then reports on the mind’s two processing systems,
the deliberative system that considers decisions consciously and the peripheral system that makes decisions unconsciously. 39 Stanchi suggests
that activating the deliberative system is most effective for merits based
arguments that lean in the client’s favor. 40 However, when the merits do
not weigh in the client’s favor, the mind’s more peripheral system is better suited for persuading through the use of abstract values. 41 Finally, in
another excerpt, Professor Stanchi relates the results of psychological
studies indicating that two-sided refutational messages (messages that
propel an argument as well as identify and refute a counter-argument) are
the most effective type of persuasive messaging in comparison with onesided messages (messages that do not recognize a counter-argument), or
two-sided non-refutational messages, which do not attempt to refute the
counter-argument. 42 In contrast, the literature suggests one-sided messages are ranked as more effective than two-sided non-refutational messages, meaning that if one is not going to refute the counter-argument,
then it is best not to even identify the opposing argument. 43
Writing about the law from the perspective of the embodied mind,
cognitive scientist Mark Johnson challenges the notion that legal categories and resultant legal meanings are the products of static pre-existing

Edwards, supra note 3, at 113, 115 (excerpting Stanchi, supra note 34).
Edwards, supra note 3, at 113-17 (excerpting Stanchi, supra note 34).
37
Id. at 122-24.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 133-36.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire: The Science of Confronting Adverse
Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 Rutgers L. Rev. 381 (2008) [hereinafter Stanchi, Playing with Fire], as reprinted in Edwards, supra note 3, at 166-67.
43
Edwards, supra note 3, at 167 (excerpting Stanchi, supra note 42).
35

36
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concepts. 44 The embodied mind “operates a living human body that is
continually engaging environments that are at once physical, social, cultural, economic, moral, legal, gendered and racialized.” 45 Because our legal categories are not constructed in a vacuum apart from our physical,
social, and political environments, it is a fallacy to approach categories
as immutable, rigid, concepts. 46 Manipulating the language of the law to
push the boundaries of existing legal categories is aligned with how the
human mind constructs its understanding of the world, even if we are not
consciously aware that this is how we think about the world. 47
Professor Edwards excerpts sources that explain the powerful ways
that metaphor and narrative work in our minds. From Robert Sapolsky,
we learn why literary metaphors work so powerfully in the brain. Sapolosky tells us that the same part of the brain that activates disgust upon
smelling rotten food is activated when one hears stories about egregious
cruelty inflicted upon another human being. 48 Professor Jennifer Shepard
explains that narrative holds such persuasive power because the human
mind is predisposed to organizing experience in a narrative form. 49 Narrative is so effective because it operates subconsciously, and the “social
knowledge embedded in the story” guides the decision rather than “the
unique characteristics of the current situation.” 50
Finally, Professor Kenneth Chestek offers evidence to substantiate
the claim that narrative reasoning is more persuasive than reasoning that

44
Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, and Law, 58 Mercer L. Rev. 845
(2007), as reprinted in Edwards, supra note 3, at 233.
45
Edwards, supra note 3, at 234-35 (excerpting Johnson, supra note 44).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Robert Sapolsky, This is Your Brain on Metaphors, N.Y. Times (Nov. 15,
2010), as reprinted in Edwards, supra note 3, at 250.
49
Jennifer Sheppard, Once Upon a Time, Happily Ever After, and in a Galaxy
Far, Far Away: Using Narrative to Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by Overreliance on
Pure Logic in Appellate Briefs and Motion Memoranda, 46 Williamette L.
Rev. 255 (2009) (citing Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning 45 (1990)),
as reprinted in Edwards, supra note 3, at 277; see also Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers, and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story Using the Characters
and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 Seattle U. L. Rev. 767
(2006) (quoting Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between
Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2225, 2228 (1989))
(“The attraction of narrative is that it corresponds more closely to the manner
in which the human mind makes sense of experience than does the conventional,
abstracted rhetoric of law.”), as reprinted in Edwards, supra note 3, at 294.
50
Edwards, supra note 3, at 278 (excerpting Sheppard, supra note 49)
(citing Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial
Decision Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in
Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 259, 264 (2009)).
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proceeds solely on logical firepower. 51 In Professor Chestek’s empirical
study, a set of judges and law clerks were presented with two briefs, a
“story” brief and a “logos” brief. 52 Professor Chestek’s results indicated
that 64.2% of the study participants found the story brief to be “more
persuasive” than the logos brief, and only 30.5% of the participants found
the logos brief to be more persuasive than the story brief. 53
The full-bodied scholarship excerpted in Edwards’s book deepens
our understanding of how to persuade legal audiences. Christopher Columbus Langdell, the 19th century Harvard law professor credited with
inventing the case-method of legal education, famously declared that “[l]
aw, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines.” 54
Langdell’s idea of treating law as a science has since been discredited, as
legal outcomes are subject to too many uncontrollable variables to be tested in the same way as chemistry and biology hypotheses. 55 But, the idea
of scientific knowledge—knowledge produced through empirical data
collection and laboratory studies—carries great legitimacy when used to
advance legal understanding. 56 Applying scientific principles and empirical approaches to discern the most effective methods of legal persuasion
further legitimizes the doctrine of legal writing.
Legal Writing Doctrine Embraces Law as an Artistic Craft
To teachers and students, legal writing often feels like a non-creative
enterprise, given its many requirements regarding form, citation, and
technical compliance. For instance, Professor Carol Parker considers
how the realm of legal education and its relentless focus on cases, rules,
and form often leaves us feeling creatively stifled. 57 Professor Parker incorporates the ideas of legal philosopher James Boyd White, who suggests we approach the study of law as a liberal education, using our imagi-

Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the
Power of Story, 7 J. ALWD 1, 10-22 (2010), as reprinted in Edwards, supra
note 3, at 272-76.
52
Edwards, supra note 3, at 273 (excerpting Chestek, supra note 51).
53
Id.
54
Carter, supra note 7, at 6.
55
Romantz, supra note 1, at 116 (discussing that although Langdell’s law as
science theory has been rejected, his pedagogical contributions remain influential).
56
See Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles
& Constitutional Truths, 82 N. C. L. Rev. 115, 118 (2003) (citing Michel
Serres & Bruno Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture
and Time 87 (1995)).
57
Carol Parker, A Liberal Education in Law: Engaging the Legal Imagination
through Research and Writing Beyond the Curriculum 1 J. ALWD 130 (2002), as
reprinted in Edwards, supra note 3, at 5-7.
51

54
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nations to develop our individual capacities as legal writers. 58 Thus, one
of Edwards’s primary themes is to reject legal writing as a discipline of
drudgery, and instead celebrate its artistic attributes.
Professor Edwards writes that developing expertise in legal communication goes hand-in-hand with an exhilarating authorial autonomy,
an autonomy that emphasizes “the kind of creativity and imagination
that seems to be missing from much of traditional legal education.” 59 In
one such excerpt, James Boyd White celebrates the practice of law as
a dynamic art form, proffering that “[e]very case, every legal conversation, is an opportunity to exercise the lawyer’s complex art of mind and
imagination.” 60 For Professor White, the practice of law involves “the art
of reconciling the ideal and the real” and the “art of language and judgment, an art of the maintenance and repair of human community.” 61
Thus, the authors excerpted in Professor Edwards’s book present an
invigorating view of what legal writing is—an art form. In this sense, referring to legal communication as art invigorates the legal writer’s professional identity, imbuing legal authors with a spirited autonomy normally
only associated with painters, filmmakers, and novelists. But, James Boyd
White successfully persuades us that lawyers, too, function as auteurs
who exercise professional judgment and discretion to resolve the tensions
that arise when “the rules collide with reality.” 62
Having established a new aspect of our professional identity—writer as autonomous artist—Edwards provides a wealth of artistic techniques, drawn from literary theory, poetry, narrative, and rhetoric, which
strengthen our craft. 63 We learn from Professor Steven E. Smith that
lawyers should choose words that accurately convey legal concepts, but
that also “provide aesthetic pleasure and engage the reader” in much
the same way that poetry does. 64 Professor Bret Rappaport invites us to
consider how our prose is heard and how we might employ rhythm, flow,
and tone to reach “an older, deeper, and more instinctual part of the brain

Edwards, supra note 3, at 5-7 (excerpting Parker, supra note 57) (citing
James Boyd White, Doctrine in a Vacuum, in From Expectation to Experience: Essays on Law and Legal Education 8, 13-14 (1999) [hereinafter White, From Expectation to Experience]).
59
Edwards, supra note 3, at 5.
60
Edwards, supra note 3, at 341 (excerpting White, supra note 17).
61
Id. at 342.
62
Id. at 340.
63
See Edwards, supra note 3.
64
Stephen E. Smith, The Poetry of Persuasion: Early Literary Theory and Its
Advice to Legal Writers, 6 J. A.L.W.D. 55 (2009), as reprinted in Edwards,
supra note 3, at 75.
58
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than sight.” 65 We learn an ancient and arresting technique from Professor Bruce Ching, the tricolon, which builds rhetorical strength from the
power of three. 66
Professor Edwards teaches the art of narrative and metaphor in legal advocacy. We learn that formal law itself, rules and analogies, are
inherently narrative and can be manipulated for persuasive ends. 67 Edwards sets forth examples of master legal authors utilizing mythological
archetypes to frame the law in a compelling way. Led through the respondent’s brief in Bowers v. Hardwick, 68 Edwards demonstrates the authors
employed an archetypical myth, the rescue story, and positioned the right
to privacy in private relationships as the object of rescue. 69 Edwards offers another recognizable mythological narrative in the petitioner’s brief
from Miranda v. Arizona, 70 which presented the legal argument as a birth
story, the origination of a new Fifth Amendment right. 71 Professor Ruth
Ann Robbins suggests how to shape a narrative theory around the client
and her case, especially when the client has some imperfections. 72 One
solution, according to Professor Robbins, is to place the client in the role
of a hero, understanding that the archetypical hero’s myth begins with an
imperfect hero and contains space for positive transformation. 73
A vision of legal writing as art celebrates legal authors as autonomous
creators of legal meanings, providing students and teachers alike with
an electric sense of possibility. Approaching legal communication as an
art form that requires a wide-ranging breadth of imagination, creativity,
and discretion cements legal writing’s place in the doctrinal curriculum.
Legal writing is doctrinal because it affirms the autonomy that forms the
65
Bret Rappaport, Using the Elements of Rhythm, Flow, and Tone to Create a
More Effective and Persuasive Acoustic Experience in Legal Writing, 16 J. Legal Writing 65 (2010), (quoting Peter Elbow, The Music of Form: Rethinking
Organization in Writing 57 C. Composition & Comm. 620, 625 (2006)), as
reprinted in Edwards, supra note 3, at 79.
66
Bruce Ching, Things in Threes—Utilizing Tricolons—a Linguistic Look,
The Law Teacher 18 (2008), as reprinted in Edwards, supra note 3, at 77.
67
Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 Legal Stud. F. 7, 20-27 (1996), as reprinted in
Edwards, supra note 3, at 280-81.
68
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
69
Brief for the Respondent, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No.
85-140), 1986 WL 720442; Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law: Myth,
Metaphor, and Authority, 77 Tenn. L. Rev. 885 (2010), as reprinted in Edwards, supra note 3, at 312-17.
70
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
71
Brief for the Petitioner, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No.
759) 1966 WL 100543.
72
Edwards, supra note 3, at 297 (excerpting Robbins, supra note 49).
73
Edwards, supra note 3, at 295-300 (excerpting Robbins, supra note 49).
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core of a lawyer’s professional identity.
Legal Writing Doctrine is Critically Introspective
Professor Edwards invites her readers to engage in valuable periods
of critical introspection and to consider issues that are usually obscured
in legal education. In the first excerpt of the book, veteran writing professor Carol Parker contemplates whether the traditional law school
classroom presents law (in James Boyd White’s phrase) as “doctrine in a
vacuum,” 74 and if so, Professor Parker encourages us to approach writing
as a liberating and liberal learning journey, where we learn law in a vibrant
context created through our prior reading, thinking, and ‘imagined future
intellectual life.’” 75
In other excerpts, legal writing professors wrestle with a well-known
pedagogical paradox—that legal writing instruction instills a set of attitudes and beliefs (e.g., adherence to legal formalisms and stare decisis)
that makes it difficult to innovate within the law. Professor Mary Falk, in
considering how to infuse more “play” in legal writing, writes that legal
writing might be incentivizing “compliance” at the expense of innovative thinking. 76 The result is that students become “authority junkies” 77
who are not able to play in the law or “think new thoughts about the
law.” 78 Professor Teresa Godwin Phelps questions whether legal writing
professors are the “vampires of the first year, draining their students of
the life-blood of creativity and storytelling.” 79 Professor Falk argues that
students can move beyond this legal education paradox by embracing the
possibilities of play in the law, understanding that
[a]nything can be analogized or contrasted or equated to anything. Boundaries—between civil and criminal, between law and
economics—dissolve. There is no one to disapprove, to note dismissively that no court has ever so held. With no responsibility
to espouse one idea, the lawyer can play flirtatiously with many. 80
74
Edwards, supra note 3, at 5-7 (excerpting Parker, supra note 57) (quoting James Boyd White, in White, From Expectation to Experience,
supra, note 58, at 13-14).
75
Edwards, supra note 3, at 6 (excerpting Parker, supra note 57) (quoting
James Boyd White, in White, From Expectation to Experience, supra
note 58, at 15-16).
76
Mary R. Falk, “The Play of Those Who Have Not Yet Heard of Games”:
Creativity, Compliance, and the “Good Enough” Law Teacher, 6 J. A.L.W.D. 200
(2009), as reprinted in Edwards, supra note 3, at 11.
77
Edwards, supra note 3, at 7 (excerpting Falk, supra note 76).
78
Edwards, supra note 3, at 7-8 (excerpting Falk, supra note 76).
79
Teresa Godwin Phelps, Tradition, Discipline, and Creativity: Developing
“Strong Poets” in Legal Writing, 20 Legal Stud. F. 89 (1996), as reprinted in
Edwards, supra note 3, at 104.
80
Edwards, supra note 3, at 10-11 (excerpting Falk, supra note 76).
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Professor Phelps argues that students have the power to overcome
the paradox, writing with discipline (adhering to the formal rules of legal
writing) and creativity. 81 Phelps writes that “[d]iscipline, in the sense of
introduction into a tradition, is not the enemy of creativity, but its necessary ally, the requisite foundation without which fruitful creativity is not
possible.” 82
Exposing students to a critique of legal education runs throughout
many of Edwards’s interludes. For instance, Professor Falk argues that
the legal writing teacher should be candid and explain that law students
are in the midst of “an education that threatens to destroy their ability
to engage in the very activity it should prepare them for.” 83 Devoting
space to critiques of legal education is both brave and unique for any
law school textbook. The goal is for the student to approach the law and
legal problems with an expansive imagination, including material that
questions why legal education and legal writing feel so uncreative, and
to encourage the law student (and the teacher) to question some of the
silent forces that contribute to law school’s caged-in feel. In considering
legal education’s potential limits, legal writing professors are encouraged
to discard old styles of thinking and adopt new modes that will further
actualize legal writing.
The introspective interludes referenced above speak from the perspective of a legal writing teacher. Most authoritative texts provide information about the subject material, but rarely do we see information
included that speaks to how it feels to teach the material. Viewing veteran legal writing teachers and scholars as our guides in these thought
exercises provides a pedagogical safety zone. These scholars are telling
us that despite what has been inculcated in us so far, it is acceptable to
question authority and embrace innovative and contextual approaches to
legal reasoning.
The reader is also invited to consider the unique power of legal
language. Professor Stanchi invites us to consider that mastery of legal
writing also carries the unintended consequence of “suppressing the
voices of those who have already been historically marginalized by legal
language.” 84 Because legal writing emphasizes an abstract vantage point
(for instance, we do not refer to the parties in a case by their real names),
“proper” legal writing tends to exclude other more contextualized view-

Edwards, supra note 3, at 106-08 (excerpting Phelps, supra note 79).
Edwards, supra note 3, at 108 (excerpting Phelps, supra note 79).
83
Edwards, supra note 3, at 8 (excerpting Falk, supra note 76).
84
Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagog y
Contributes to the Law’s Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 Dick. L. Rev.
7 (1998) [hereinafter Stanchi, Resistance is Futile], as reprinted in Edwards,
supra note 3, at 17.
81

82
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points. 85 In mastering legal writing, we are excluding other viewpoints
and silencing our own individual voices. 86
Critically considering the power of legal writing arms the student
with a better understanding of how her words directly impact outcomes
once she gets out into practice. Thus, understanding the power of legal
words is helpful for constructing holistic lawyers with professional and
ethical mindsets. Considering how legal writing and power intersect supports the argument that legal writing is doctrinal—that it is more than
just writing per se. Infusing some criticality into the teaching of legal
writing accurately recognizes that “[a]ll legal communication takes place
within a dense web of social and structural relationships which legal writing necessary reflects (and reproduces).” 87
Plato credits Socrates for remarking that “the unexamined life is not
worth living.” 88 Edwards’s introspective themes ensure that all readers
(teachers and students alike) will walk away from the text with a greater
awareness of some of the limits and paradoxes we face as legal writers.
Contemplating how legal education tends to stifle creativity, we can visualize law as a space for innovation and play rather than just a narrow environment bound by rules and form. In studying legal writing, introspection
also produces a meta-understanding of the competencies and skills we
seek to acquire. In reading Edwards’s book, we are of course acquiring
legal knowledge, but Edwards carefully guides us to spaces where we can
contemplate how our newfound knowledge (and the power it brings) fits
into our vision of the lawyers we aspire to be. Legal writing’s doctrinal
emphasis on critical introspection encourages students to enter the legal
community with compassion and discourages the adoption of a hired gun
persona, happy to make any legal argument for remuneration.
Legal Writing Doctrine is Substantive
Legal writing has long been held hostage to the false view that it is not
substantive. As the argument goes, legal writing lacks substance because
writing is writing, designed to emphasize remedial composition skills

Edwards, supra note 3, at 17 (excerpting Stanchi, supra note 84).
Id.; see also J. Christopher Rideout, Voice Self and Persona in Legal Writing, 15 J. Legal Writing 67 (2009) (quoting Julius Getman, Colloquy: Human Voice in Legal Discourse: Voices, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 577, 578 (1988)) (explaining how legal education seeks to develop the law student’s “professional voice”
which “situates itself at a distance, ‘as though its user were removed from and
slightly above the general concerns of humanity.’”), as reprinted in Edwards,
supra note 3, at 20-21.
87
Sossin, supra note 1, at 888.
88
Plato, Apology, line 38.
85

86
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and nothing more. 89 Legal writing is rarely perceived as “important or as
significant,” 90 but is usually treated as “marginal and peripheral.” 91 Legal
writing is a “non-intellectual . . . glorified grammar course[,]” 92 and being
assigned to teach it “represents a real threat to success in achieving genuine legitimacy as a law teacher in the accepted [traditional] image.” 93 On
the other side of the coin are the “heroic” traditional casebook courses,
referred to as substantive courses. 94 Because legal writing focuses heavily on what lawyers do, structural and historical forces have produced a
deeply embedded, but erroneous, belief that legal writing is non-substantive. From a sociological and historical perspective, the hierarchical disparagement of legal writing may be the product of a professionalization
process. At the turn of the century, elite law professors, formed in the
mold of Harvard professor Christopher Columbus Langdell, sought to
cement their legal education model as the only acceptable credential for
entry into the profession. 95 This effort meant that the Harvard-style law
professor had to distance himself from members of the practicing bar and
practice-oriented teachers who held the keys to other credentialing models like the apprenticeship method and the lecture method of teaching,
respectively. 96 As a result of this tension, elite law professors developed
a professional identity emphasizing expertise in substantive law scholar-

89
Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 22, at 41. Professors Rideout and Ramsfield explain that this view that “writing is writing” originated in the now discarded “controlled composition” method of teaching writing, which proceeded
upon the erroneous premise that writing is secondary to thinking. Id. at 44-45.
90
Romantz, supra note 1, at 107.
91
Id. at 133.
92
Beazley, supra note 24, at 80.
93
William H. Pedrick, William N. Hines, & William A. Reppy, Jr., Should
Permanent Faculty Teach First-Year Legal Writing?A Debate, 32 J. Legal Educ.
414 (1982).
94
Sossin, supra note 1, at 883-84.
95
John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American
Legal Realists: The Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. Legal
Educ. 311, 312-16, 320-22 (1985); see also Carter, supra note 7, at 30-32, 97-105.
Professor Carter explains that Professor Langdell faced opposition from state
bar associations’ entry requirements, which required bar applicants to spend a
certain amount of time in a law apprenticeship but did not grant credit to Harvard law graduates for time spent pursuing their degree. Id. at 30-32. Ultimately,
Langdell elected to stop negotiating with the state bar authorities on the matter,
which “he had to know . . . meant a move away from the bar itself.” Id. at 32. As
a result of these tensions, legal education moved away from the practicing bar as
law professors began to emphasize their theoretical and scholarly prowess and
exclude practicing lawyers from university centered legal education. Id. at 94,
97-105.
96
Carter, supra note 7, at 94, 106; Schegel, supra note 95, at 320-22.
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ship and theory, but denigrating law practice. 97 This historical tension
remains with us today, as practice-oriented teaching is still sometimes
disparaged as reducing law school to a mere “trade school.” 98
Historical timing might provide an additional explanation for legal
writing’s impoverished identity. In the 1950s, when law schools first added legal writing courses to their curriculum, the mass of students attending law schools through the GI Bill lacked basic grammar and composition skills. 99 As a result, the new legal writing courses took on a remedial
focus, an identity that remains attached to legal writing courses today. 100
At the same time, however, law schools were adding a separate course,
Legal Method, which focused heavily on legal analysis and foundational
jurisprudential theory, with some attention to legal bibliography. Yet,
Legal Method did not incorporate an intensive writing practice. 101 Legal
Method courses were added in the 1950s to develop “the student’s own
artistry in the use of the techniques of the profession . . . through the
repeated and disciplined experience in case analysis and synthesis, and
in the use of statutes.” 102 Unfortunately, a dichotomy developed between
legal writing courses, perceived as “extraordinarily simplistic” or “very
Carter, supra note 7, at 94, 106; Schegel, supra note 95, at 320-22.
The pejorative “trade school” label dates back to the turn of the century
and was used to disparage students at part-time night schools serving mostly
working class students. Robert Stevens, Law School Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s 113, 114-15 (1983). The
appellation survives in the present and is used to insult schools that emphasize
teaching and skills training. Laurel Terry, Taking Kronman and Glendon One Step
Further: In Celebration of “Professional Schools,” 100 Dick. L. Rev. 647, 66869, nn. 61-62 (1996).
99
Romantz, supra note 1, at 128 (citing Marjorie Dick Rombauer, First-year
Research and Writing: Then and Now, 25 J. Legal Educ. 540 (1973)).
100
See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 22, at 41 (describing the traditional
view of “legal writing courses as remedial, either explicitly or implicitly”).
Writing in the 1970s, Professor Rombauer explains that the majority of law
school’s legal writing programs had adopted a remedial orientation, even though
some programs, such as the University of Chicago Law School, touted their
writing programs as incorporating both composition and substantive legal problem solving. Marjorie Dick Rombauer, First-year Research and Writing: Then and
Now, 25 J. Legal Educ. 540, 541-42 (1973). Unfortunately, legal writing did
not seize the opportunity for “teaching and honing the broader intellectual legal
skills.” Id. at 542.
101
Rombauer, supra note 100, at 541. A few legal method courses did provide some training in writing. The legal method course at Rutgers was divided
into three general topics: (1) lessons on legal research, (2) jurisprudence and
constitutional analysis, and (3) writing assignments (a scholarly writing piece, a
traditional research memorandum, and a transactional drafting exercise). Donald Kepner, The Rutgers Legal Method Program, 5 J. Legal Educ. 99, 99-100
(1952).
102
Harry W. Jones, Notes on the Teaching of Legal Method, 1 J. Legal
Educ. 14, 27 (1948).
97

98
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unsophisticated,” 103 and Legal Method courses, grandiosely constructed
as covering “competent case and statutory analysis, along with the huge
complex of theories, traditions, conventions, and norms comprising the
American legal science.” 104 Legal Method courses were usually taught by
traditional faculty, 105 but the writing courses were (and still are) taught by
lower-tier teachers, adjuncts, and students. 106 However, as legal method
courses have gradually disappeared from the law school curriculum, 107
legal writing teachers can and should claim this turf and engage with material that was once the domain of legal method courses. 108
Legal writing professors know it is not possible to separate the compositional aspects of what we teach from the more dominant substantive aspects. We cannot separate the substance of the law from the words
we use to forge legal meanings. We routinely cover the intellectual and
analytical material covered by the old legal method courses. Professor
Edwards’s book illustrates the best argument for attacking the erroneous perception that legal writing lacks substance: legal writing is lawmaking. 109 In considering the role of lawyers in our common law system,
Professor Linda Berger writes that we should situate legal writing as the
process of making law, where “the law is ‘constituted’ as human beings
located within particular historical and cultural communities [who] write,

103
Richard B. Cappalli, The Disappearance of Legal Method, 70 Temp. L.
Rev. 393, 432 (1997) (arguing that the legal writing course is not capable of
teaching legal method material). Professor Cappalli, a legal method professor
at Temple, further posits that several legal writing textbooks present “dubious,
debatable, or flatly wrong” statements concerning synthesis and legal reasoning. Id. at 432-33. Fully challenging Professor Cappalli’s criticisms is beyond
the scope of this article, but it is worth noting that Cappalli’s criticisms, viewed
in the context of our highly indeterminate common law system, where there is
rarely an agreed upon meaning for particular terms such as a rule or holding,
seem myopic and pedantic.
104
Id. at 431.
105
See id. at 395-98. Implicit in Professor Cappalli’s overall description of
legal method is that it is the domain of the traditional casebook faculty member,
rather than skills teachers, whom he holds partially responsible for driving legal
method “into obscurity.” Id. at 397.
106
Romantz, supra note 1, at 132.
107
See Cappalli, supra note 103, at 405-11 (describing the gradual drop-off in
law schools offering legal method courses).
108
Of course, one challenge is how to fit this material into the writing curriculum in the first-year, or instead to stagger it throughout the first-year and
upper level courses.
109
White, supra note 15, at 162 (concluding that students consider and apply
the law, they are actually engaging in the process of making law).
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read, argue, and decide legal issues.” 110 James Boyd White argues that the
goal of the lawyer in interpreting the law and contributing to the process
of making new law is to “reconstitute the material of the past to claim
new meaning in the present and future.” 111
Understanding legal writing as law-making enables us to reject the
false dichotomy between technical form and substantive law and forge a
new identity as law teachers who engage our students with legal theory,
substantive law, and the art and craft of effective legal communication.
Professor Edwards’s excerpt “Using Legal Theory to Sharpen Your Legal Arguments” exemplifies how legal writing courses meld theory, substance, and practice together. 112 This excerpt explains how to recognize
various jurisprudential theories in a case and then utilize that reasoning in one’s own argument. The pertinent jurisprudential theories are
presented chronologically—natural law, formalism, legal realism, legal
process, fundamental rights, law and economics, and critical legal theory—in the same order that a student would learn about them in a jurisprudence course. 113 Also included are short case opinion excerpts that
test the student’s ability to discern the jurisprudential posture of the judicial author. 114
This excerpt shows that jurisprudence, traditionally categorized as
an intellectual and theoretical subject existing on a higher plane than
legal writing, is actually intimately connected with the process of legal
writing. 115 Competent legal writing, particularly the process of analyzing judicial opinions and forming grounded policy arguments, requires a
basic understanding of the philosophical concepts that underlie all legal
reasoning. An appreciation for legal theory, both in practice and in critical approach, is integral to being able to manipulate and mold the law on
behalf of one’s client.
Legal writing teachers should reject the false dichotomy between substance and writing because it harms students; the dichotomy
“cripple[s] legal writing programs because [it has] ensured that the complex task of introducing novices to legal discourse cannot be reasonably
110
Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching “Law as Rhetoric”: A Place to
Stand, 16 J. Legal Writing 3, 5 (2010), as reprinted in Edwards, supra
note 3, at 37.
111
Edwards, supra note 3, at 330 (excerpting White, supra note 17).
112
Linda H. Edwards, Using Legal Theory to Sharpen Your Arguments in
Linda H. Edwards, Legal Writing & Analysis 227-43 (3d ed. 2011)
[hereinafter Edwards, Using Legal Theory], as reprinted in Edwards, Readings in Persuasion, supra note 3, at 181-202.
113
Edwards, Readings in Persuasion, supra note 3, at 181-202 (excerpting Edwards, Using Legal Theory, supra note 112).
114
Id.
115
Edwards, Readings in Persuasion, supra note 3, at 181-202 (excerpting Edwards, Using Legal Theory, supra note 112).
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undertaken.” 116 Presenting ourselves as substantive law professors is a
very hard task when the dichotomy is engrained in the foundation of our
institutional culture and power structures and often results in unfair and
unequal treatment (manifesting in disparate salary, job security, job title,
and other status markers). However, legal writing teachers should project
ourselves as we want to be perceived, regardless of how others actually
perceive us. Unlike traditional casebook faculty, who may have forged a
professional identity that emphasized theory and law at the expense of
practice, 117 our professional identity should be founded upon inclusion,
not exclusion. In this day and age, where sky-rocketing tuition, onerous
student debt, and a constricted job market has called into question the
value of the J.D., the legal writing teacher’s ability to connect the dots
between substance, theory, and the art and craft of law practice puts her
in a position to propel legal education in innovative directions. 118
Legal Writing Doctrine Contextualizes and Humanizes the Traditional Case Method
In Part Two, Edwards’s use of exemplary appellate briefs and cases
to illustrate how legal writers positively contribute to the production of
law directly aligns with a traditional, Langdellian 119 vision for legal education pedagogy. Moreover, the expansive way in which Edwards employs
these materials improves Langdell’s case-method. Professor Langdell’s
vision of law teaching, requiring students to study a series of appellate
cases with the goal of synthesizing general legal principles from them,
improved upon the pre-existing lecture method of legal education, which
had students learning the law through rote memorization of hornbook
texts and professor lectures. 120 A little known fact is that Langdell placed
great importance on connecting legal theory to practice. 121 For instance,
in his civil procedure course, Langdell had his students work in small
groups to draft pleadings and then assigned his students to argue against

Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 22, at 41.
See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
118
See Kirsten A. Dauphinais, Sea Change: The Seismic Shift in the Legal
Profession and How Legal Writing Professors Will Keep Legal Education Afloat in its
Wake, 10 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 49 (2011).
119
Langdellian refers to Harvard professor Christopher Columbus Langdell,
credited with inventing the case method of legal education. Carter, supra note 7,
at 49-52; Romantz, supra note 1, at 112-18.
120
Carter, supra note 7, at 52; Romantz, supra note 1, at 116.
121
Carter, supra note 7, at 60, 68. Langdell writes that “[t]o have such a
mastery of [legal concepts] as to be able to apply them with constant facility and
certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true
lawyer.” Id. at 60 (quoting Christopher C. Langdell, A Selection of
Cases on the Law of Contracts vi (The Lawbook Exchange ed. 1999
(1871)).
116
117
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each other. 122 Langdell presided over weekly practice arguments 123 and
participated in Harvard’s extracurricular appellate advocacy and briefwriting exercises. 124
Langdell’s case method thus improved legal education by placing the
student in the driver’s seat. Early on, Langdell’s vision for legal education was holistic and practice oriented. 125 As Langdell’s case method
developed and others adopted it, the method evolved into an intensive
and adversarial approach to Socratic questioning 126 and the elevation of
theory and doctrine at the expense of practice skills. 127
In its current form, Landgell’s case method has been criticized as
creating an unrealistically abstract version of reality, 128 one where students are encouraged to push social context and morality to the margins
and focus the narrow skill of applying a closed set of facts (the relevant
facts) into abstract legal categories. 129 “The problem is that as students
are drawn into this new discursive practice, they are drawn away from
the norms and conventions that many members of our society, including
future clients, use to solve conflicts and moral dilemmas.” 130 A common
criticism of the overall thrust of legal education is that its heavy reliance
on the case method unduly rewards “theory over practice, scholarship
over teaching, cognitive [analysis] over ethical engagement.” 131 Despite
these well-founded criticisms, Langdell’s case method remains an “elegant” pedagogy that continues to instill a deep and adaptive understanding of the law. 132 It succeeds in developing a student’s cognitive and
Carter, supra note 7, at 65.
Id. at 66.
124
Romantz, supra note 1, at 127-28.
125
See Carter, supra note 7, at 60.
126
Landgell himself was described as a “gentle, modest, [and] even kind.”
Carter, supra note 7, at 63.
127
Id. at 94, 103, 106.
128
William M. Sullivan, et al., Educating Lawyers, Preparation for the Profession of Law 55 (2007) (sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching); see also Lopez, supra note
7, at 336 (“Make anyone read, talk about, and deploy too many appellate cases,
they say, and you’ll see them inevitably move away from everyday life—away
from detail, away from context, and away from passion.”); Jerome Frank, Why
Not A Clinical Lawyer School? 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907, 911 (1933) ( Judge Frank
writes that edited appellate opinions are “emasculated explanations of decisions
. . . of limited assistance to the practicing lawyer.”).
129
Mertz, supra note 9, at 99.
130
Id.
131
Sullivan, et al., supra note 128, at 114 (citing Bryant Garth & Joanne
Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of Competence, 43 J. Legal Educ.
469 (1993)).
132
Romantz, supra note 1, at 106, 118.
122
123
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analytical legal skills. 133 And it is an efficient pedagogical tool, an “intellectual Model T, a wholly complete, conceptually unified universe to put
in the mind of the standard student.” 134 Cognizant of the case method’s
limits, conscientious legal educators now seek to augment the case method by infusing more context and grounded problem-solving approaches
into the classroom. 135
Edwards’s book expands upon Langdell’s original vision for legal
education by injecting vibrant historical and cultural context to the cases
being studied. We understand that these cases, and the advocacy that
produced their outcomes, involve “real people with real problems.” 136
For instance, in learning about the Muller v. Oregon 137 case, for which
Louis Brandeis produced the so-called Brandeis brief, we have come to
understand the case’s labor history context and the un-heralded role of
the female law advocates who formed the social science arguments in
Brandeis’s brief. 138
The excerpts on Brown v. Board of Education 139 and Loving v. Virginia 140 humanizes the plaintiffs and reveals why they decided to litigate
their civil rights. 141 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 142 illustrates how critical legal theorist Catherine Mackinnon artfully deployed legal theory in a
Sullivan, et al., supra note 128, at 11.
Schlegel, supra note 95, at 323.
135
See, e.g., Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. the Case Method: A
Marvelous Adventure in Which Winnie The Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, 34 Cal. W.
L. Rev. 351, 352 (1998) (arguing that teachers can utilize the problem-solving
method in conjunction with the case method, which is only “one analytical
tool among many” to produce better student learning outcomes); D.A. Jeremy
Telman, Langdellian Limericks, 61 J. Legal Educ. 110, 112 (2001) (“One
can supplement the case method with legal limericks in a way that tempers the
naive scientism, formalism, intimidation of students and other-worldliness that
can characterize Socratic courses.”); Craig J. Albert, Property in Context, 22
Seattle U. L. Rev. 873, 890 (1999) (reviewing J. Gordon Hylton et
al., Property Law and the Public Interest (1998)) (explaining that
the case method works well if a case book author can present the cases with an
“overarching context”).
136
Lawrence Lessig, A Message to Law Grads, Instead of Corporations, Help
Ordinary People, The Atlantic (May 31, 2012, 5:20 PM), http://www.
theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/05/a-message-to-law-grads-instead-ofcorporations-help-ordinary-people/257945/.
137
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
138
Linda Edwards, Muller v. Oregon, in Edwards, supra note 3, at 350-52.
139
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
140
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
141
Dean John Valery White, Brown v. Board of Education, in Edwards,
supra note 3, at 357-61; Dean John Valery White, Loving v. Virginia, in Edwards, supra note 3, at 362-65.
142
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
133

134
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successful way. 143 We understand the privacy cases, Bowers v. Hardwick 144
and Lawrence v. Texas 145 from the perspective of the individuals whose
privacy was infringed upon. 146 Gideon v. Wainwright 147 represents a human
portrait of a pro-se litigant who changed the course of the criminal justice
system. We were introduced to the children implicated in the juvenile
punishment cases of Furman v. Georgia 148 and Roper v. Simmons. 149
Using real cases infused with context to illustrate how advocacy and
rhetoric shapes the law presents a holistic framework for learning the law.
Edwards’s book illustrates three objectives for legal education identified
in the Carnegie Foundation’s 2007 report on legal education—analytical
ability, ethical awareness, and the lawyer’s professional identity. 150 The
book is also laudable for including the briefs that produced the legal outcomes in these cases. Students who use this book will form independent
conclusions of advocacy approaches employed by the brief authors. The
doctrine of legal writing encompassed in this book is in line with a traditional Langdellian approach to legal education, but it is also innovative
because it humanizes and contextualizes the legal process.
Conclusion
Returning to the metaphor that legal education is a religious
experience, 151 but focusing on individual enlightenment, we might characterize Professor Edwards’s book as a concordance for the doctrine of
legal writing. Professor Edwards’s book teaches that mastery of the doctrine of legal writing produces nothing less than law-makers, professional
community members vested with the power and ability to shape the structure of legal outcomes that profoundly impact one’s societal framework.
As Edwards’s book evinces, the inception of legal writing as a doctrine
has been borne out through the sweat of the many master teachers and
scholars represented in the book. Many of these teachers have labored
143
Ann C. McGinley, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in Edwards, supra
note 3, at 378-84.
144
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
145
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
146
Carlos A. Ball, Bowers v. Hardwick & Lawrence v. Texas, in Edwards,
supra note 3, at 400-14.
147
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Penny J. White, Gideon v. Wainwright, in Edwards, supra note 3, at 424-29.
148
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
149
543 U.S. 551 (2005); Sean D. O’Brien, Furman v. Georgia & Roper v.
Simmons, in Edwards, supra note 3, at 433-43.
150
See generally William M. Sullivan, et al., supra note 128 (examining the results of a two-year study of legal education conducted at sixteen
American and Canadian law schools from 1999-2000).
151
Mertz, supra note 9, at 51.
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in an academy that viewed legal writing as “donkey work” 152 that could
never be a substantive or an intellectual enterprise of value. Nonetheless,
these expert teachers and scholars, led by Edwards, have produced an
enduring wisdom that affirms the rewarding and empowering possibilities
of law teaching and law practice.

152
William Pedrick and William A. Reppy, Jr., Should Permanent Faculty
Teach First-Year Legal Writing? A Debate, 32 J. Legal Educ. 413, 414 (1982).
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